core/tools/process: drop host TTY restore; rely on CSI sanitize only

This commit is contained in:
2026-07-18 16:26:23 +08:00
parent 896dc98d20
commit edd54a427c
6 changed files with 35 additions and 127 deletions
+1 -1
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@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ Module-level `@tool` handlers. Call `set_workspace_root()` before use.
- **`workspace`**: path resolve under root; path substring denylist; command basename denylist; clearer deny messages.
- **`file`**: `read_file`, `write_file`, `listdir`, `tree` (VCS + default noise dirs + optional `skip_dirs` / denylist walk), `glob_paths`, `grep_files` (regex, skip VCS/binary), `edit_replace`, `edit_lineno` (1-based range), `copy_path` / `move_path` / `delete_path`.
- **`process`**: `run_command` (argv, no shell, timeout, optional stdin/env); PTY `open_pty` / `read_pty` / `write_pty` (literal) / `write_pty_keys` (escapes) / `close_pty` (POSIX: `pty`+`fork`; Windows: ConPTY via `pywinpty` env marker dep).
- PTY: backend in `pty_backend.py`; structured status (`alive`/`exit_code`/`data`); `read_pty(..., until=)` (CSI sanitized for host safety); keys via `write_pty_keys` only (`\xHH`, `ctrl+x`, `key=esc`); session limit/idle TTL/output budget; close terminate→kill + **host TTY restore**.
- PTY: backend in `pty_backend.py`; structured status (`alive`/`exit_code`/`data`); `read_pty(..., until=)` (**CSI sanitized** so host TTY is never reset); keys via `write_pty_keys` only (`\xHH`, `ctrl+x`, `key=esc`); session limit/idle TTL/output budget; close terminate→kill.
- CLI limit hooks: interactive confirm to raise tool-loop rounds, PTY session cap, or PTY output budget.
- Destructive confirms: `classify_danger` + `ToolRegistry(on_confirm=…)`; CLI default deny; config `confirm_destructive` / `path_denylist`. Session YOLO: `/yolo on|off|once` and `--yes` (skip soft confirms; hard denylists unchanged; `once` expires after the next user turn).
- **`vcs`**: read-only VCS tools (`vcs_kind` / `vcs_status` / `vcs_diff` / `vcs_log` / `vcs_branch`) via `VcsBackend` protocol; **git** implemented; detectors are pluggable for other systems.
+2 -2
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@@ -232,8 +232,8 @@ Safety defaults:
- Command basename denylist (e.g. dangerous shells/utilities).
- Destructive tools (delete/move/overwrite) can require confirm (`confirm_destructive`; default deny in non-TTY). Override for the session with `/yolo on|off|once` or startup `--yes` (path/command denylists still apply).
- PTY sessions: caps, idle TTL, output budget; master FD is non-inheritable; sessions closed on chat exit.
Prefer file tools over full-screen editors (`vim`/`nano`) for edits. `read_pty` escapes CSI so tool
results cannot reprogram the host TTY; `close_pty` / chat exit also restore the host terminal.
Prefer file tools over full-screen editors (`vim`/`nano`) for edits. `read_pty` sanitizes CSI/controls
so tool results cannot reprogram the host TTY (no host terminal reset on exit).
`write_pty` is literal text only; use `write_pty_keys` for `\xHH`, `ctrl+x`, `key=esc|enter|…`.
## Usage / context (CLI)
-1
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@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
from .close_pty import close_pty as close_pty
from .open_pty import open_pty as open_pty
from .pty_terminal import decode_write_data as decode_write_data
from .pty_terminal import restore_host_terminal as restore_host_terminal
from .pty_terminal import sanitize_pty_output_for_tool as sanitize_pty_output_for_tool
from .read_pty import read_pty as read_pty
from .run_command import run_command as run_command
+4 -10
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@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ from threading import Lock
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, ClassVar
from plyngent.tools.process.pty_backend import PtyHandle, pty_available, spawn_pty
from plyngent.tools.process.pty_terminal import restore_host_terminal, sanitize_pty_output_for_tool
from plyngent.tools.process.pty_terminal import sanitize_pty_output_for_tool
from plyngent.tools.workspace import WorkspaceError, check_command_allowed, resolve_path
if TYPE_CHECKING:
@@ -330,7 +330,6 @@ class PtyManager:
message="unknown session",
)
if session.closed:
# No host restore: no child was torn down this call.
return PtyCloseResult(
session_id=session_id,
closed=True,
@@ -358,8 +357,8 @@ class PtyManager:
with cls._lock:
_ = cls._sessions.pop(session_id, None)
# Host TTY may have been reprogrammed if tool results echoed CSI.
restore_host_terminal()
# No host TTY reset: tool-facing read_pty sanitizes CSI so chat echo
# cannot reprogram the user terminal.
return PtyCloseResult(
session_id=session_id,
closed=True,
@@ -387,12 +386,7 @@ class PtyManager:
@classmethod
def close_all(cls) -> None:
"""Close every open session.
Host TTY restore runs only when at least one session was actually closed
(via :meth:`close`). Empty registry is a no-op — important so Ctrl-D /
chat exit does not flash-reset the terminal when no PTY was used.
"""
"""Close every open session (no host TTY reset)."""
with cls._lock:
ids = list(cls._sessions.keys())
for session_id in ids:
+20 -48
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@@ -1,34 +1,16 @@
"""Host-terminal safety helpers for agent PTY sessions.
"""PTY payload helpers for agent tools.
Child PTY I/O is isolated on the master FD. The practical leak is that
``read_pty`` returns raw CSI/alt-screen sequences which the CLI then echoes
to the *user's* stdout as tool results — those bytes reprogram the host TTY.
Child PTY I/O stays on the master FD. Tool results are printed on the *user*
TTY by the CLI, so any CSI/control bytes in ``read_pty`` data would reprogram
the host terminal. We sanitize on the tool boundary instead of resetting the
host after close (which flashes the screen on every chat exit).
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import contextlib
import re
import sys
from typing import Final
# Leave alt-screen, restore cursor visibility, reset SGR, keypad, mouse, etc.
# Intentional over-reset: cheap and safe after TUI children.
_HOST_RESTORE: Final[str] = (
"\x1b[?1049l" # leave alternate screen buffer
"\x1b[?47l" # leave alt screen (legacy)
"\x1b[?25h" # show cursor
"\x1b[0m" # reset SGR
"\x1b[?1l" # normal cursor keys
"\x1b[?1000l" # mouse off
"\x1b[?1002l"
"\x1b[?1003l"
"\x1b[?1006l"
"\x1b[?2004l" # bracketed paste off
"\x1b[?7h" # wraparound on
"\r\n"
)
# Match common \xNN / \uNNNN / named ctrl+ / esc sequences in write_pty_keys data.
_HEX_BYTE = re.compile(r"\\x([0-9A-Fa-f]{2})")
_HEX_U = re.compile(r"\\u([0-9A-Fa-f]{4})")
_CTRL = re.compile(r"ctrl\+([a-z@\[\\\]\^_])", re.IGNORECASE)
@@ -54,39 +36,30 @@ _KEY_MAP = {
}
_SIMPLE_ESCAPE_LEN = 2
def restore_host_terminal() -> None:
"""Best-effort reset of the *user* terminal (stdout), if it is a TTY."""
try:
out = sys.stdout
if not out.isatty():
return
buffer = getattr(out, "buffer", None)
if buffer is not None:
with contextlib.suppress(OSError, ValueError):
_ = buffer.write(_HOST_RESTORE.encode("ascii", errors="replace"))
_ = buffer.flush()
return
with contextlib.suppress(OSError, ValueError):
_ = out.write(_HOST_RESTORE)
_ = out.flush()
except AttributeError, OSError, ValueError:
return
# C0 controls except TAB/LF/CR (those stay for readable logs).
_UNSAFE_CTRL = re.compile(r"[\x00-\x08\x0b\x0c\x0e-\x1f\x7f]")
def sanitize_pty_output_for_tool(data: str) -> str:
"""Make PTY bytes safe to print on the host as tool/chat text.
Escapes ESC (``\\\\x1b``) so CSI sequences are visible text instead of
control codes when the CLI echoes tool results.
- ESC becomes the two-character sequence ``\\\\x1b`` so CSI is not executed
when the CLI echoes tool results.
- Other C0 controls (except tab/LF/CR) become ``\\\\xHH``.
"""
if not data or "\x1b" not in data:
if not data:
return data
return data.replace("\x1b", "\\x1b")
def _esc_ctrl(match: re.Match[str]) -> str:
return f"\\x{ord(match.group(0)):02x}"
# ESC first as a stable, readable form used in docs/tests.
out = data.replace("\x1b", "\\x1b")
return _UNSAFE_CTRL.sub(_esc_ctrl, out)
def decode_write_data(data: str) -> str:
"""Expand agent-friendly escapes into raw PTY input.
"""Expand agent-friendly escapes into raw PTY input (for ``write_pty_keys`` only).
Supported (as literal characters in ``data``):
@@ -98,7 +71,6 @@ def decode_write_data(data: str) -> str:
if not data:
return data
# Order: multi-char named tokens first, then hex, then simple backslash pairs.
out: list[str] = []
i = 0
n = len(data)
+8 -65
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@@ -4,8 +4,6 @@ import asyncio
import sys
from pathlib import Path
import pytest
from plyngent.tools.process import (
close_pty,
open_pty,
@@ -314,82 +312,28 @@ def test_decode_write_data_escapes() -> None:
def test_sanitize_pty_output_escapes_csi() -> None:
from plyngent.tools.process.pty_terminal import sanitize_pty_output_for_tool
raw = "\x1b[?1049hhello\x1b[0m"
raw = chr(0x1B) + "[?1049hhello" + chr(0x1B) + "[0m" + chr(7)
safe = sanitize_pty_output_for_tool(raw)
assert "\x1b" not in safe
assert chr(0x1B) not in safe
assert "\\x1b" in safe
assert "hello" in safe
assert "\\x07" in safe
def test_close_all_empty_does_not_restore(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
"""Ctrl-D / chat exit calls close_all with no sessions must not flash TTY."""
import plyngent.tools.process.pty_session as ps
calls: list[int] = []
def fake_restore() -> None:
calls.append(1)
monkeypatch.setattr(ps, "restore_host_terminal", fake_restore)
def test_close_all_empty_is_noop() -> None:
"""Ctrl-D / chat exit with no sessions must not touch the host TTY."""
PtyManager.close_all()
assert calls == []
def test_restore_host_terminal_noop_when_not_tty(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
import sys
from plyngent.tools.process.pty_terminal import restore_host_terminal
class FakeOut:
def isatty(self) -> bool:
return False
def write(self, _s: str) -> int:
raise AssertionError("should not write")
monkeypatch.setattr(sys, "stdout", FakeOut())
restore_host_terminal() # no-op
def test_restore_host_terminal_writes_when_tty(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
import sys
from plyngent.tools.process.pty_terminal import restore_host_terminal
written: list[bytes] = []
class Buf:
def write(self, data: bytes) -> int:
written.append(data)
return len(data)
def flush(self) -> None:
return None
class FakeOut:
buffer = Buf()
def isatty(self) -> bool:
return True
monkeypatch.setattr(sys, "stdout", FakeOut())
restore_host_terminal()
assert written
blob = b"".join(written)
assert b"\x1b[?1049l" in blob
async def test_read_pty_sanitizes_esc(workspace: object) -> None:
del workspace
try:
# Print ESC so tool-facing read must escape it.
opened = call_sync(open_pty, _py("print('\\x1b[31mred\\x1b[0m')"))
opened = call_sync(open_pty, _py("print(chr(0x1B)+'[31mred'+chr(0x1B)+'[0m')"))
session_id = _session_id(opened)
text = await call_async(read_pty, session_id, timeout=2.0, until="red")
assert "red" in text
# Raw ESC must not appear in tool payload.
payload = text.split("--- data ---", 1)[-1]
assert "\x1b" not in payload
assert chr(0x1B) not in payload
assert "\\x1b" in payload or "red" in payload
_ = await call_async(close_pty, session_id)
finally:
@@ -424,8 +368,7 @@ def test_write_pty_is_literal() -> None:
from plyngent.tools.process.pty_terminal import decode_write_data
# Decoder is intentionally aggressive; that is why write_pty stays literal.
assert decode_write_data("press ctrl+c to cancel") == "press \x03 to cancel"
assert decode_write_data("press ctrl+c to cancel") == "press " + chr(3) + " to cancel"
src = inspect.getsource(write_pty.handler)
assert "decode_write_data" not in src
doc = write_pty.description or write_pty.handler.__doc__ or ""